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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to
Section 3 of Article VIII of the Constitution of the State of
Utah, and Utah Code Anno. 78-2-3(j)(1988) and Rule 5 Utah R. App.
P.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Appellee, Toby Gottling (Gottling), believes the issue in
this case is more properly stated: "Does a former employee state
a cause of action under Utah law against an employer, employing
less than fifteen employees, when she alleges she was terminated
for refusing to continue a sexual relationship with her
supervisor?"
This issue was resolved in favor of Gottling on a cross
motions for summary judgment by the trial court.

Review of a

trial court's grant of summary judgment is a determination of
whether the trial court correctly applied governing law,
affording no deference to the trial court's determination or
conclusions of law. Burton

v.

Exam Ctr.

Indus.

& Gen Med.

Clinic,

2000 UT 18, 1[4, 994 P.2d 1261.
Appellants suggest that there are additional issues, which
they list as issues three and four in their brief, both dealing
with the personal liability of Peterson.

However, the order from

which they appeal makes clear that the trial court did not rule
on those issues but instead they were "... reserved for decision

1

until after plaintiff has taken discovery," [record at 318, %3] .
Despite the fact that the trial court did not rule for or against
them Appellants have addressed the personal liability of Peterson
in both their Petition for Interlocutory Appeal and their Brief
on Appeal.

Presumably this is because they believe they are

appealing the trial court's failure to grant them the relief they
sought.

Accordingly, Gottling has briefed the issues pertaining

to this issue and leaves it to the court to determine whether
this issue is actually before it.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Burton

v.

Exam Ctr.

Indus.

& Gen Med.

Clinic,

2000 UT 18, 994

P.2d 1261
Peterson
Retherford

v. Browning,

832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992)

v. AT&T, 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992)

Title VII Civil Rights Act of 1964 (as amended) 42 USC §2000e
UT Exec Order March 17, 1993 - Gov. Leavitt;
UT Exec Order June 30, 1989 - Gov. Bangerter;
UT Exec Order July 25, 1986 - Gov. Bangerter;
UT Exec Order May 28, 1985 - Gov. Bangerter;
UT Exec Order January 12, 1982 - Gov. Matheson;
UT Exec Order July 17, 1980 - Gov. Matheson;
UT Exec Order May 4, 1979 - Gov. Matheson;
UT Exec Order October 1, 1977 - Gov. Matheson;
UT Exec Order December 6, 1973 - Gov. Rampton;
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UT Exec Order October 1, 1965 - Gov. Rampton.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
Gottling brought suit after she was fired by the appellants.
Gottling alleged she was terminated because she refused to
continue a sexual relationship with Peterson, the owner of
Carbmaster and her supervisor.

At the time Gottling was

terminated, Appellants employed fewer than 15 employees.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Gottling filed her complaint alleging wrongful termination
in violation of a clear and substantial public policy after she
was fired when she refused to continue a sexual relationship with
Appellant Kelly Peterson (Peterson).

Peterson is the owner of

Appellant Carbmaster (Carbmaster) and was Gottling's supervisor
at Carbmaster.
After Gottling filed suit Appellants answered.

Gottling

filed a motion for partial summary judgment arguing that
Appellants defenses of pre-emption by the Utah AntiDiscriminatior+ Act (UADA) and failure to exhaust administrative
remedies were invalid.

Appellees filed their own Motion for

Summary Judgment arguing that the UADA pre-empted the claim.
Gottling moved to amend her complaint based upon evidence
Appellants had provided that Carbmaster was a dba of a

3

corporation.

In that amendment Gottling added additional legal

bases for her public policy wrongful termination claim.
The court heard the cross motions for summary judgment and
ruled against Appellants and in favor of Gottling on the preemption issue.

The court reserved ruling on the motions for

summary judgment on Peterson's personal liability until discovery
was completed.

The ruling on pre-emption was based upon

Gottling's second amended complaint which is currently the
operative complaint in the file. Appellants received permission
to file an interlocutory appeal and the matter moved to this
court.
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT
The trial court correctly ruled that Gottling's complaint
states a cause of action against Carbmaster when it granted
Gottling's motion for partial summary judgment and denied
Appellants' motion for summary judgment.
RELEVANT FACTS WITH CITATION TO THE RECORD
Gottling sued Appellants alleging that she was terminated
because of her sex in violation of public policy because she
refused to have sex with Peterson, [record at 2, 300].
Appellants answered and asserted two affirmative defenses
relevant to this action.

M . Plaintiff's claims are pre-empted

by the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act" and "5. There has been a
failure to exhaust administrative remedies." [record at 9, 329].

4

Gottling had actually anticipated a motion to dismiss rather than
an answer.

Gottling then filed a motion for summary judgment and

asked the court to strike Appellants' fourth defense, that
Gottling's claims were pre-empted by the UADA, and their fifth
defense, that she had not exhausted her administrative remedies,
[record at 17]. Appellants' motion for summary judgment asked
the court for an order "... declaring as a matter of law ...
Gottling has failed to establish the existence of the new tort
plaintiff asks the court in this lawsuit to recognize." [record
at 72] . The trial court then decided the purely legal issues
which may be reduced to the question, does Gottling's complaint
state a cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of
public policy?

The trial court issued its memorandum decision

holding that the Utah Civil Rights Act and the numerous Executive
Orders of the governors of the state of Utah established a public
policy against termination based on state law and that Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act also established such a public policy.
[record at 291] The court then entered the order which Appellants
have appealed, [record at 317]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Utah Civil Rights Act, Utah Code Anno. 13-7-1, and
Executive Orders of Utah Governors provide a clear and
substantial public policy against termination of an employee in
Utah because of sex.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

5

as amended, and other federal statutes and regulations also
provide such a public policy.
Because a claim for wrongful termination in violation of
public policy is a tort Peterson's actions were tortious.

The

fact that he arguably took those actions in his position as an
officer of Carbmaster does not shield him from personal liability
from that tort.
ARGUMENT
I
THERE EXISTS A CLEAR AND SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC POLICY AGAINST
SEX DISCRIMINATION UNDER UTAH LAW
A.
THERE EXISTS A CLEAR AND SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC POLICY AGAINST
SEX DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE UTAH CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
The trial court's memorandum decision cited the Utah Civil
Rights Act, Utah Code Anno. 13-7-1, as a Utah statute
establishing a clear and substantial public policy against
terminating a person on account of their sex.

That section of

the act is entitled "policy and purposes of act" and provides;
It is hereby declared that the practice of
discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex,
religion, ancestry, or national origin in business
establishments or places of public accommodation or in
enterprises regulated by the state endangers the
health, safety, and general welfare of this state and
its inhabitants; and that such discrimination in
business establishments or places of public
accommodation or in enterprises regulated by the state,
violates the public policy of this state. It is the
6

purpose of this act to assure all citizens full and
equal availability of all goods, services and
facilities offered by business establishments and
places of public accommodation and enterprises
regulated by the state without discrimination because
of race, color, sex, religion, ancestry, or national
origin. The rules of common law that statutes in
derogation thereof shall be strictly construed has no
application to this act. This act shall be liberally
construed with a view to promote the policy and
purposes of the act and to promote justice. The
remedies provided herein shall not be exclusive but
shall be in addition to any other remedies available at
law or equity.
Contrary to Appellants' suggestion, there is nothing in the
Civil Rights Act to suggest that its provisions or its policy do
not apply to employment.

The act itself provides: "[t]his act

shall be liberally construed with a view to promote the policy
and purposes of the act and to promote justice. The remedies
provided herein shall not be exclusive but shall be in addition
to any other remedies available at law or equity."

In other

words, the Act sets the policy for the state and anticipates
other types of actions being brought in reliance upon that
policy.

It is exactly this type of policy this court envisioned

when it defined the general parameters of claims for wrongful
termination in violation of public policy in Peterson
Browning.

v.

This court has already held that the policy of the

Utah Civil Rights Act intends that it be construed as broadly as
possible to combat discrimination.
Lodge

Beynon

v. St.

George-Dixie

#1743, 854 P.2d 513 (Utah 1993), cert, denied, 510 U.S.

869, 114 S. Ct. 195, 126 L. Ed. 2d 153 (1993).
7

Appellants' argument misconstrues the holding of Peterson
Browning.

v.

They would require that Gottling sue under the Act in

order for the public policy of the Utah Civil Rights Act to
apply. They are in error.
the act.

The public policy is only declared by

Gottling need not sue Appellants under the Act to have

that policy apply any more than Mr. Peterson was required to sue
Browning Arms under the Utah and Missouri tax codes or federal
customs law.

All Peterson

required was that the plaintiff

identify the source of the public policy, not that she sue under
it.
Similarly, Appellants' argument that Gottling may make use
of the Utah Civil Rights Act only as a customer is flawed.
policy established by the act is clear.

The

Sexual discrimination is

pernicious to the "general welfare of this state and its
inhabitants." Utah Code Anno. 13-7-1.

Inhabitants, not just

customers.
B.
THERE EXISTS A CLEAR AND SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC POLICY AGAINST
SEX DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE GOVERNORS' EXECUTIVE ORDERS
Gottling provided the trial court copies of ten Executive
Orders issued by Utah's current and past governors. Recent
Republican and Democratic governors issued Executive Orders
stating that public policy in Utah deplores sexual harassment and
sexual discrimination. Appellants argue that the Executive Orders
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may not be the source of public policy because Executive Orders
may not legislate.

Again they miss the point.

not been sued under the Executive Orders.
under the theory of Peterson

v.

Browning,

Appellants have

They have been sued
832 P.2d 1280 (Utah

1992) .
Each of the cited Executive Orders recites the evils of sex
discrimination and/or harassment in its preamble.

A preamble is

"an introductory statement in a constitution, statute, or other
document explaining the document's basis and objective."
Law Dictionary 1194 (7th ed. 1999).

Blacks

The objective of each of

these Executive Orders is to denounce sex discrimination and
harassment and then to exercise as much authority as the Governor
has to eradicate it.

The fact that Governors are not entitled to

enact statutes eliminating sex discrimination, or any other
statute for that matter, does not mean that they have not
enunciated the policy of the state against it.

Compare Governor

Leavitt's statement in the Executive Order of March 17, 1993;
"... the occurrence of sexual harassment undermines the integrity
of the workplace, destroys morale and offends social and legal
standards of acceptable behavior." [record at 44]. Clearly this
does not refer only to government employees. [Emphasis added.]
In his Executive Order of March 17, 1993 Governor Leavitt
further directed, "by the authority vested in me by the
Constitution and laws of this state, [I] do hereby prohibit

9

sexual harassment, which is a form of sex discrimination, in any
and every workplace in which state employees and employees of
public and higher education are required to conduct business."
[Emphasis added.]

Obviously state employees of agencies like the

Workers Compensation Division of the Utah Labor Commission1, the
Utah Occupational Safety and Health Administration2, and Work
Force Services3, and other entities are required to conduct
business in every business of the state.

Appellants' business is

covered by the March 17, 1993 Executive Order.
Similarly, Governor Bangerter's Executive Order of July 25,
1986; "to judge an individual, expressly or through implication,
by his/her race, color, sex, religious creed, national origin,
age or handicap, is repugnant to every American ideal and a
distortion of our standards of human freedom and worth."
Governor Bangerter then identified the breadth of that policy.
"It is the duty of every American citizen to protect and promote
the right of all persons to find employment where their
individual capacities lead them." [Emphasis added.] id.
Governor Bangerter's Executive Order of July 25, 1986
further provides;

HJtah Code Anno. 34A-2-802
2

Utah Code Anno. 34A-6-104

3

Utah Code Anno. 35A-1-104
10

. . . the basic rights of all the people of bhis nation
are the rights to seek a livelihood, opportunity for
advancement and the respect of our society based solely
on the individual's ability and capacity. To judge an
individual, expressly or through implication, by
his/her race, color, sex, religious creed, national
origin, age or handicap, is repugnant to every American
ideal and a distortion of our standards of human
freedom and worth. [Emphasis added.]
Clearly Governor Bangerter did not believe that the public policy
of the state of Utah limited basic employment rights to those
women employed by large employers.
Governors Leavitt, Bangerter, Matheson, and Rampton would
all have been very surprised to learn that they did not have the
power to set public policy for the state of Utah.

It is clear

from Article VII of the Constitution of the State of Utah that
the governor h^s the power to make public policy.

"... the

office of governor is political, ... the discretion vested in the
chief executive by the constitution and laws of the state
respecting hiSj official duties is not subject to control or
review by the courts and ... his proclamations, warrants and
orders made in the discharge of his official duties are as much
due process of law as the judgment of a court."

3 8 Am.Jur.2d,

Governor §10. Governors may set the public policy of the state
through their executive orders.

The public policy of the state

of Utah, for at least the last 35 years, has been against sexual
harassment and discrimination.

A termination in violation of

11

that policy is a wrongful termination in violation of public
policy.
That Executive Orders are among the varieties of law which
this and other courts will look to for public policy in analyzing
a wrongful termination may be seen by the opinion in

Burton.

There this court compared Dr. Burton's position to the law
established by the Maryland court in Molesworth
distinguished it because in Molesworth

v. Brandon and

the plaintiff had relied

upon a Maryland Executive Order in addition to statutes.
C
THERE EXISTS A CLEAR AND SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC POLICY AGAINST SEXUAL
DISCRIMINATION UNDER UTAH CODE ANNO. 76-10-1302
The operative complaint in this matter is the Second Amended
Complaint which the Appellants have answered, [record at 299,
327].

At paragraph 13 of that complaint Gottling alleged that

Utah Code Anno. 76-10-13 02 forms the basis for a public policy
wrongful termination claim.
Utah Code Anno. 76-10-1302(a) provides that a person is
guilty of prostitution when he engages in any sexual activity
with another person for a fee.

Gottling alleged that she was

fired when she refused to continue a sexual relationship with
Peterson.

Peterson was demanding that she provide him sexual

favors in exchange for her job.

This variety of consideration is

clearly covered by Utah Code Anno. 76-10-1302 (a) .

12

The public policy of this statute is public and intended to
benefit society more than individuals.
requirements of Peterson

v. Browning

It meets all of the

to form the basis for a

claim of wrongful termination in violation of public policy.

In

the unlikely event the court determines that the broader policy
Gottling urges should be found in the Utah Civil Rights Act and
in the Governors' Executive Orders do not apply, Gottling,
nonetheless, states a claim upon which relief may be granted.
II
THERE EXISTS A CLEAR AND SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC POLICY AGAINST
SEX DISCRIMINATION UNDER FEDERAL LAW
It was clear that federal statutes may state public policy
from this court's first clarification of public policy wrongful
termination claims in Peterson

v. Browning,

at 1283.

There the

court said; *Although many state and federal laws will reflect
Utah public policy and may, in fact provide a source of Utah
public policy, a plaintiff must establish the connection between
the law violated and the public policies of Utah.
done here."

That has been

There Peterson sued because he was fired for

refusing to falsify federal customs documents.
That this court does not reject a public policy claim out of
hand merely because it is predicated on federal lawr may also be
seen from its analysis in Ryan

P.2d 3 95, 4 06 (Utah 1998).

v.

Dan's

Food Stores,

Inc.,

972

There the court spent more than two

13

full pages analyzing Ryan's claim that his termination had
violated the public policy found in sections of the Code of
Federal Regulations.

If federal law could not form the basis for

a public policy wrongful termination claim the court would have
merely told Ryan that federal law cannot provide a basis for a
wrongful termination claim and dismissed him out of hand.
A
THERE EXISTS A CLEAR AND SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC POLICY AGAINST
SEX DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII
Utah's policy is to prohibit discrimination within the
State, not merely to prohibit discrimination among employers with
more than 15 employees.

Other states have examined this same

issue in light of anti-discrimination acts, which also have
jurisdictional limits based on the number of employees, and held
that discrimination statutes do describe clear and substantial
public policy.
Molesworth

v.

See Bennett v. Hardy,

Brandon,

Magnum Entertainment
v.

Rizkana,

784 P.2d 1258 (Wash. 1990);

672 A.2d 608 (Md. 1996); Kerrigan
Inc.,

v.

804 F.Supp. 733 (D.Md. 1992);

652 N.E.2d 653 (Ohio 1995); Roberts

P.2d 901 (Wash. 2000); Williamson

v. Greene,

v.

Dudley,

Collins
993

490 S.E.2d 23 (W.Va.

1997) .
Retherford

provides the analysis for the inquiry as to

whether a public policy is clear and substantial.
note 9.

14

Retherford

at

In determining whether a public policy is sufficiently
"clear and substantial" to support a cause of action for
discharge in violation of public policy, one must examine
the strength of the policy as well as the extent to which it
affects the public as a whole. The very words "clear and
substantial" require a lack of ambiguity on both points. As
the majority of this court recognized in Peterson, all
statements made in a statute are not expressions of public
policy. Many statutes merely regulate conduct between
private individuals or "'impose requirements whose
fulfillment does not implicate fundamental public policy
concerns.*" [Citations omitted.]
The following questions are relevant to determining
whether a statute embodies a clear and substantial public
policy. First, one must ask whether the policy in question
is one of overarching importance to the public, as opposed
to the parties only. Second, one must inquire whether the
public interest is so strong and the policy so clear and
weighty that we should place the policy beyond the reach of
contract, thereby constituting a bar to discharge that
parties cannot modify, even when freely willing and of equal
bargaining power.
These two questions are both answered affirmatively in the case
of sex discrimination.
The policy prohibiting sex discrimination is one of
overarching importance to the public, as opposed to the parties
only.

The Policy against age discrimination is clear and

substantial on numbers alone.

There are more than 11 million

people employed by employers with too few employees to be covered
by the Act, Rivers

v.

Roadway

Express

Inc.,

S.Ct. 1510, 128 L.Ed.2d 274, (1994) Note 6.

511 U.S. 298, 114

Congress felt so

strongly about sex discrimination that it directed the Attorney
General of the United States to file suit to enforce Title VII 42
U.S.C. § 2000^-6.

It also imposed punitive damages as a penalty

against employers who violate that Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
15

The scope of the problem is no different in Utah.

69.7% of

Utah's employees work for employers employing 14 or fewer
employees.

Burton

at 1(25, note 2.

The fact that Title VII has jurisdictional requirements
based on the number of employees does not mean the public policy
is merely to prohibit discrimination by those employers with 15
or more employees.
Molesworth

v.

That argument was rejected by the court in

Brandon,

672 P.2d 608 (Md. 1996).

There the court

examined a wrongful termination claim brought by another woman
who claimed she was terminated because of her sex by an employer
with fewer than the required number of employees.

The

Molesworth

court noted that the legislative history of Title VII indicated
that the reason for the 15 employee requirement for cases
submitted to EEOC was that including all employers would create a
significant backlog for EEOC, Id.

at 614.

Title VII reflects a clear and substantial public policy
against discrimination based on sex.
1
BURTON DOES NOT APPLY TO TITLE VII
In Burton

v.

Exam Center,

387 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 2000 UT 18

(Utah 2000) this court examined the plaintiff's age
discrimination case under the UADA and determined held that
statute did not provide a clear and substantial public policy
against age discrimination.

There the court specifically said
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its decision d^d not preclude an examination of other statutes to
determine whether there was a clear and substantial public policy
against sex, r^ce, religious or disability discrimination.
Burton at 2000 UT 18 fl7.

The court's major emphasis was on the

UADA's simplified and expedited resolution procedure.
In this matter Gottling asks the court to hold that a clear
and substantial public policy against termination on the basis of
sex in Utah is found in the Utah Civil Rights Act, the Utah
Governors' Executive Orders, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (as amended) as well as in other federal law. The
analysis does not apply to this case.

Burton

While sex discrimination

claims brought under Title VII are investigated by the Utah AntiDiscrimination and Labor Division (UALD), they, unlike UADA
claims, are not heard in the UALD venue.

If a negotiated

resolution is not reached within the UALD a Notice of Right to
Sue is issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) and the claimant may then become a plaintiff in a law suit
brought in state or federal court.

In short, a Title VII sex

discrimination claim does not have the benefit of the expedited
administrative procedures a UADA claim does and the
analysis does not apply to Title VII claims.

Burton

Further, the

legislative history of Title VII shows that the purpose for
excluding small employers was to reduce the case load of the EEOC
and not to provide some alternative to litigation as the court
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found in Burton.

In short, the Burton

analysis does not apply to

Title VII and Title VII provides a clear and substantial public
policy against termination because of sex.
B
THERE EXISTS A CLEAR AND SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC POLICY AGAINST
SEX DISCRIMINATION UNDER OTHER FEDERAL LAW
Title VII is not alone as a federal statutory basis for the
clear and substantial public policy against termination because
of sex.

At 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) congress prohibited discrimination

in compensation based on sex, regardless of the number of
employees, so long as the employer meets the other requirements
of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

It goes without saying that if

an employer may not discriminate in the amount of compensation it
cannot discriminate in whether to pay any compensation at all,
i.e., whether to fire on the basis of sex.
42 U.S.C. §5057 makes it illegal to for an employer,
regardless of size, to discriminate based on sex among certain
volunteers, i.e., people who do not get paid.

If clear and

substantial public policy prevents sex discrimination among
volunteers clearly there is such a policy preventing the
termination, based on sex, from employment upon which a woman
relies for her livelihood.
Specific regulations of the federal government show a clear
and substantial public policy against sex discrimination,
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regardless of tlfie size of the employer.

Businesses who contract

with the Federal Railroad Administration4, the Federal Highway
Administration5, the Federal Communications Commission6
specifically, afid the government generally7 may not discriminate
based on sex no matter how few employees they have.

In analyzing

regulations and statutes we must remember that the Peterson
Browning,

v.

did not create a cause of action for the violation of

individual statutes or regulations.

It merely held that the

statutes or regulations must be analyzed to see whether their
policy is clear and substantial.

If there is a clear and

substantial public policy against sex discrimination for small
firms who contract with the federal government to perform
janitorial services the policy remains clear and substantial
against sex discrimination by small firms who contract with the
state or a private firm to perform those same janitorial
services.

If there is a clear and substantial public policy

against sex discrimination by small firms who perform janitorial
services the policy remains clear and substantial against sex
discrimination by small firms who do anything else.

4

49 CFR §265.7(a) (1) (i)

5

23 CFR §2.30.113

6

47 CFR §73.2080

7

41 CFR §^0-1.4
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For many years neither congress nor the President of the
United States were prohibited in any fashion from discriminating
against their employees on the basis of sex.

As of 1996 both of

these employers are required to treat women employees no
differently than they treat men, including in firing decisions.
See 2 U.S.C. §1311, 3 U.S.C. §411. When both of these employers
who have previously been able to do as they wish are now
restricted in their ability to fire a woman because of her sex it
is clear that the national public policy is clearly and
substantially against allowing an employer, of any size, to fire
a woman because of her sex.
Ill
GOTTLING'S CLAIMS ARE NOT PRE-EMPTED
The trial court examined the purely legal issue of whether
Gottling's termination, as alleged, stated a claim for wrongful
termination in violation of public policy.

There was no dispute

that at all relevant times Carbmaster had fewer than 15
employees.

The trial court held that these facts do state a

cause of action upon which relief may be granted.
Gottling's claim would have been pre-empted and she would
have been allowed to proceed with her sex discrimination claim
under the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, UCA 34A-5-101 et seq. or
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 if Carbmaster had 15 or
more employees.

Since Carbmaster had fewer than 15 employees it
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is not an "employer" under the UADA.8

Because Carbmaster is not

an "employer," Gottling is not an "employee" under the Act.
Because the parties are not "employers" or "employees" under the
Act, there is rio jurisdiction for either to seek relief or to be
required to respond to claims raised under the Act and the UADA
does not pre-empt Gottling's claims.
Appellants argued that the UADA pre-empts Gottling's claims
and relied on the analysis of Retherford
(Utah 1992).

Actually reading Retherford

not pre-empt Gottling's claims.
must offer alternative relief.
Gottling.

Retherford

v.

AT&T, 844 P.2d 949

shows why the UADA does

To pre-empt a claim, a statute
The UADA offers no relief to

analyzes both Utah and Federal statutes in

its pre-emption discussion.
In Retherford,

at 968-969, the court analyzed the Labor

Management Relations Act (LMRA) which pre-empts various labor
claims because those claims may be addressed undei: collective
bargaining agreements.
The justification for this expansive view of section
3 01 preemption is the ease with which an aggrieved
employee otherwise could turn a suit for breach of a
collective bargaining agreement into a state tort or
contract claim, thereby obtaining a state law holding
that might result in an inconsistent interpretation of
the collective bargaining agreement.
Id.

8

The term "'employee' means any person applying with or
employed by an employer." Utah Code Ann. §34A-5-102(6). The
term "'employer' means . . . every . . . person employing 15 or
more employee^ within the state . . .." Utah Code Ann. §34a-5102 (7) .
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That pre-emption is justified because the employee has relief
available under a collective bargaining agreement.

Other Federal

statutes may pre-empt other types of claims when relief is
available under those statutes.
Retherford

also addressed pre-emption by Utah state

statutes. At 965, the court discussed pre-emption under the
Worker's Compensation Act.

The key to whether there was pre-

emption was u. . . that the Workers' Compensation Act provided
the exclusive remedy . . ."

Id.

[Emphasis added.]

The Workers'

Compensation Act pre-empts claims of injured workers when it
provides a remedy for those claims through an administrative
process.
Finally, Retherford
Retherford,

discussed pre-emption by the UADA.

In

the Utah Supreme Court did not hold that the UADA

pre-empted all discrimination claims as the trial court suggests.
Instead it said xx. . .we conclude that taken as a whole, the
version of the UADA in effect at the time of Retherford's firing
defined retaliation as discrimination and provided the exclusive
remedy for this type of discrimination."
added.]

Id.

at 962.

[Emphasis

As with both the LMRA and the Workers' Compensation Act,

the UADA pre-empts those claims for which it provides remedies to
claimants.
Other courts have used this same analysis in holding that
statutes like the UADA do not pre-empt discrimination claims
22

against small employers.
Inc.,
Collins

In Kramer

v.

Windsor

Park

Nursing

Home,

943 F. Supp. 844, (S.D. Ohio 1996), the court applied
v.

Rizk\ana,

652 N.E.2d 653 (Ohio 1995) which acknowledged

the type of caujse of action Gottling filed.

The Kramer

court

responded to the pre-emption argument there, ". . . despite
O.R.C.§4112, the plaintiff in Collins

had no adequate remedy

since her empldyer was exempt from coverage by the statute.
[Citation omitted.]

The court did not believe that the

legislature meant for small business to have a 'license to
sexually haras$/discriminate against their employees with
impunity.'"
Because Carbmaster is not an "employer" and because Gottling
is not an "employee" under the UADA, that Act provides Gottling
no remedy.

Because the Act provides no remedy, it does not pre-

empt her wrongful termination claim.
IV
PETERSON IS PERSONALLY LIABLE IN TORT
In Utah, the wrongful termination of an employee in
violation of piublic policy is a tort.
1284.

Peterson

v.

Browning,

at

Appellees don't dispute that Gottling was terminated by

Peterson.

A cjorporate officer, an agent, is not shielded from

liability for a tort committed on behalf of her principal, the
corporation.
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Utah courts have cited with approval the Restatement
(Second) Agency,5 and American Jurisprudence, Second, on Agency,10
and Corporations11.

Each of these respected treatises describes

the law which makes Peterson liable for her tortious actions in
illegally terminating Gottling.
The Restatement:
343. General Rule
An agent who does an act otherwise a tort is not relieved from liability by the fact that he acted at the
command of the principal or on account of the principal, except where he is exercising a privilege of the
principal, or a privilege held by him for the
protection of the principal's interests, or where the
principal owes no duty or less than the normal duty of
care to the person harmed. Restatement (Second) Agency,
§343.
The Restatement, again:
344. Liability for Directed Conduct or Consequences
An agent is subject to liability, as he would be for
his own personal conduct, for the consequences of
another's conduct which results from his directions if,
with knowledge of the circumstances, he intends the
conduct, or its consequences, except where the agent or
the one acting has a privilege or immunity not
available to the other. Restatement (Second) Agency,
§344.
American Jurisprudence, Second:

9

Gildea

10

v.

Carlie

^SII

v.

Guardian

Title

Morgan,

922 P.2d 1 (Utah 1996)

Megadiamond,

Inc.

Co.,

970 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1998)

v. American

969 P.2d 430 (Utah 1998)
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Super abrasives

Corp.,

. . . an qmployee who tortuously causes injury to a
third person may be held personally liable to that
person regardless of whether he or she committed the
tort while acting within the scope of employment,
because of the employee's liability is based on
personal wrongdoing independent of the employment
relationship." 27 Am.Jur. 2d, Employment Relations,
§488.
American Jurisprudence, Second, again:
If . . . q. director or officer commits or participates
in the commission of a tort, whether or not it is also
by or for the corporation, he is liable to third
persons injured thereby, and it does not matter what
liabilityjattaches to the corporation for the tort. A
contrary rule would enable a director or officer of a
corporation to perpetrate flagrant injuries and escape
liability behind the shield of his representative
character, even thought the corporation might be
insolvent |or irresponsible. 18B Am.Jur. 2d,
Corporations, §1877
The treatise law is that Peterson is liable for her tort in
wrongfully firing Gottling.
Other counts have likewise found corporate officers liable
in situations similar to that before the court.
AFBIC Development

Corp.,

In Dillon

v.

597 F.2d 556, 562 (9th Cir. 1979) the

individual was held liable under the Federal Fair Housing Act
where he made factual misrepresentations while acting in his
capacity as vice president of the corporate defendant.
v.

Houston,

In

Tash

74 Mich. App. 566, 524 N.W.2d 579, 581 (1977) summary

judgment for the individual defendants was denied in a tortious
interference with contract case where the individual was acting
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on behalf a union.

In Fiol

v.

Doellstedt,

50 Cal.App. 4th 1318,

58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 308, 315 (1996) the court declined to dismiss
claims against a corporate representative who personally
discriminated against an employee under the Fair Employment and
Housing Act.
V
THE ORDER IS NOT FLAWED
Appellants argue that the court's order is flawed in that it
exceeds the breadth of the memorandum decision.

If Appellants

were correct and some disharmony between the two documents
existed it is the order which would prevail. Morgan
854 P.2d 559 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Hartford
Clegg,

Ace.

V.

Morgan,

& Indem.

Co.

v.

103 Utah 414, 135 P.2d 919 (1943).
Notwithstanding Appellants' confusion there does not appear

to be a conflict between the Order [record at 318] and the
Memorandum Decision [record at 291]. Appellants' complaint,
according to their brief at 47-48, is that the Order disposes of
the issue of Peterson's personal liability.

Gottling's reading

of paragraph three of the Order is that "Defendant's Motion fo
Summary Judgment on the personal liability of defendant Kelly
Peterson is reserved for decision until after plaintiff has taken
discovery."

This very issue was discussed by the court in oral

argument on February 20, 2 001.

There at page 28 line 23 through

page 29 line 22 the court suggested that it was going to reserve
26

ruling on Peterson's liability.

Language to that effect was

placed in the proposed order and then for clarity, interlineated
by the court.

Clearly, the trial court reserved the issue of

Peterson's liability until later.
CONCLUSION
Toby Gottling was fired because of her sex.

There is a

clear and substantial public policy against that firing found in
the Utah Civil Rights Act, the Governors' Executive Orders, Title
VII and other federal statutes.

This court should deny

Appellants' appeal and send the matter back for trial on the
merits.

DATED this

^ J

day of ^^0^/1^^-!

2001.

ROBERT H.
Attorney for Appellant
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ADDENDA
1.

Memorandum Decision

2.

Order

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT <p£ UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT

TOBY GOTTLING,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

V.

KELLY PETERSON, dba Carbmaster,
Civil No. 000210087
Judge Michael K Burton

Defendant.

There are several motions pending before the court.1 Plaintiffs motion for partial
summary judgment and Defendant's cross motion for summary judgment are dispositive of
certain prominent issues and the Court will address motions first and then move on to the
remaining motions.
Summary judgment is warranted when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In
determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the Court "view[s] the facts and all
reasonable inferences draWn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." K &
T, Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 624 (Utah 1994). Because both parties are moving for
summary judgment, each motion must be evaluated separately, drawing all inferences in favor of
1—
1

1) Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;
2) Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment;
3) Plaintiffs Motion to Amend the Complaint;
4) Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion;
5) Defendant's Motion for Protective Order; and
6) Defendant's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Plaintiff.

the non-moving party.
Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment seeks to eliminate four of the
Defendant's affirmative defenses which are: 1) That the Defendant is not the real party in interest
because plaintiff was employed by P.R. Incorporated, LLC, not Kelly Peterson personally;
2) That because the Plaintiff was employed by a corporation, Defendant Kelly Peterson is not
personally liable for Plaintiffs wrongful termination; 3) That the Plaintiffs claims are preempted
by the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act (UADA); and 4) That the Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies under the UADA. Defendant's motion for summary judgment, on the
other hand, seeks prevail on three of its affirmative defenses: 1) That the Plaintiffs cause of
action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy is preempted by the UADA; 2) That
there is no clear and substantial public policy against firing an employee under the circumstances
of this case; and 3) That Kelly Peterson cannot be personally liable for the wrongful termination
of the Plaintiff because PR., Inc. and not Mr. Peterson was Plaintiffs employer. The Court will
address each issue in turn.
Defendant urges that there is no support in Utah law for Plaintiffs cause of action for
Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy. Defendant further argues that Burton v.
Exam Center Industries, 994 P.2d 1261 (2000), precludes Plaintiffs claim on the basis that it is
preempted by the UADA. The Court disagrees with Defendant's contentions.
There is ample case law in Utah supporting a cause of action for wrongful termination in
violation of public policy. See generally, Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992);
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989) Most recently the Utah Supreme
Court addressed the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine in Burton v.
Exam Center Industries, 994 P.2d 1261 (Utah 2000). In that case, the plaintiff alleged that he

-o c* n

was discriminated agajnst on the basis of his age and was fired for that reason. He sued his
employer for terminating his employment in violation of a public policy against age
discrimination.

The Utah Supreme Court stated:

An at-will employee may overcome that presumption be demonstrating that (1)
there is an impjied or express agreement that the employment may be terminated
only for cause or upon satisfaction of another agree-upon condition; (2) a statute
or regulation restricts the right of an employer to terminate an employee under
certain conditions; or (3) the termination of employment constitutes a violation of
a clear and substantial public policy, [citations omitted] In that case, we further
remarked that not every employment termination that has the effect of violating
some public policy is actionable: "a public policy whose contravention is
achieved by an employment termination must be 'clear and substantial' to be
actionable." Declarations of public policy can be found in constitutions and
statutes, but not all statements made in statutes are expressions of public policy.
Id, at 1263 (quoting Fox v. MCI Communications Corp.. 931 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1997).
In Burton, the plaintiff relied solely on the UADA to establish a clear and substantial
public policy against age discrimination. The Court was not persuaded that the UADA alone
established a clear and substantial public policy against age discrimination with respect to small
employers (i.e. employees with less than fifteen employees). The Court stated,
This exemption of small employers from the FEHA ban on age discrimination
was enacted simultaneously to and is inseparable from the legislative statement of
policy. For that reason, and because no other statute or constitutional provision
bars age discrimination, we conclude that there presently exists no 'fundamental
policy' which precludes age discrimination by a small employer.
Id. at 1264 (emphasis added). However, the Court also specifically limited its decision to
claims of age discrimination, stating, "Suffice it to say that sex, race, religion, and disability may
present different considerations and a public policy against discrimination on those grounds
might conceivably be found in other statues of this state. That question is not before us and we
express no opinion on that subject." Id.
Separate and apait from the UADA, the Utah Civil Rights Act also prohibits
*-} C^ "u

discrimination based on sex, but notably, leaves out any mention of age discrimination.2 Utah
Code Ann. § 13-7-1 (2000). Additionally, the plaintiff has cited ten executive orders from
governors of the State of Utah, including our current governor, all forbidding the practice of
sexual harassment in every workplace in which state employees are required to conduct business.
Finally, plaintiff has cited to 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e et. seq. as evidence of an overriding federal
public policy against sexual discrimination. In light of these statements of public policy from
the Utah legislature, the Utah executive branch, and Congress, this Court is persuaded that there
is a clear and substantial public policy forbidding discrimination based on sex. Therefore, the
Plaintiff has stated a cognizable cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public
policy
The remaining issue is whether the Plaintiffs claim is pre-empted by the UADA. There
is no controlling authority on this issue, and therefore, the Court will borrow from the reasoning
of another jurisdiction. In Molesworth v. Randall 672 A.2d 608 (Md. Ct. App. 1996), the
Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that Maryland's version of the Anti-Discrimination Act did not
preempt a common law cause of action for wrongful discharge of an employee by an employer
with less than fifteen employees. The Maryland Court reasoned that it would be improper to
assume that the legislature meant to insulate employers with less than fifteen employees from the

2

It is hereby declared that the practice of discrimination on the
basis of race, color, sex, religion, ancestry, or national origin in
business establishments or places of public accommodation or in
enterprises regulated by the state endangers the health, safety, and
general welfare of this state and its inhabitants; and that such
discrimination in business establishments or places of public
accommodation or in enterprises regulated by the state, violates the
public policy of this state.
Utah Code Ann. § 13-7-1 (2000) (emphasis added.)

state public policy against discrimination based on sex. Rather, a more accurate interpretation of
the legislature's intent was that the exception for employers with less than fifteen employees was
a means to avoid overburdening the administrative agency responsible for enforcing the Act.
The Court correctly pointed out that, had the legislature intended to protect small employers from
common law wrongful discharge, it could have included small employees in the Act and thus
preempted the field of employment discrimination entirely.
Similarly, in Utah, our state legislature could have preempted the field of employment
discrimination, but choise not to. It would be inequitable to find that there is a clear public policy
against discrimination on the basis of sex, but that small employers are granted a license to
discriminate and their epiployees have no recourse available to them. Therefore, the Court finds
that the UADA does noi preempt Plaintiffs common law cause of action for wrongful
termination in violation of public policy. Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion for partial summary
judgment is granted with respect to affirmative defenses four and five.
The remaining issue raised in the parties' cross motions for summary judgment is
whether the Defendant can be held personally liable for the wrongful termination alleged by the
Plaintiff, or whether Plaintiff must name the corporate employer P.R., Inc. as a defendant. The
Court will hold off reaching a decision on that issue for two reasons. First, the Plaintiff has
sought leave to amend her complaint to name PR., Inc. as a defendant. The Court will grant
Plaintiff leave to amend her complaint should she choose to do so. However, the Court will not
issue an advisory opinion as to whether Mr. Peterson would be personally liable while plaintiffs
motion to amend her complaint is pending.
Second, Plaintiff has filed a Rule 56(f) motion asking the Court to refrain from ruling on
the issue of Mr. Peterson's liability until she has had an opportunity to take his deposition.

Plaintiff has alleged that Mr. Peterson did not maintain the corporate formalities separating
himself from P.R., Inc. The Plaintiff is entitled to discover whether the interests and ownership
of the corporation were such that they justify piercing the corporate veil. Therefore, PlaintifFs
Rule 56(f) motion is granted.
Defendant's Motion for Protective Order and Defendant's Motion to Strike the Affidavit
of the Plaintiff are denied.
Dated this / /

day of J $ ^ r 2 Q 0 1

/

Michael K. Burtoij
f./
District Court Judge <A

ROBERT H. WILDE #3466
* I $ jK
RUSSELL A. DENTON #8903
*** ^
#
ROBERT H. WILDEJ ATTORNEY AT LAW, P.C.
L\] » - ?l%?
Attorneys for Plaintiff
TUir*
° "
935 East South Union Avenue Suite D-102 y^&JDlS^
rw
2
:
WrK
Midvale, Utah 84047
'
'^\ ^LfjpL^T'
Telephone:
(80l|) 255-4774
'"'n*^vf'

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, MURRAY DEPARTMENT
INI AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
TOBY GOTTLING,

ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs,
Civil No. 000210087
KELLY PETERSON DBA CARBMASTER,
Judge Michael K. Burton
D^fendant.
ooOoo
This matter came on regularly before the court on the 20 T H day of
March, 2001 at the hour of 1:30 a.m. for consideration of Plaintiff's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment, Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint, Plaintiff's Rule
56(f) Motion, Defendant's Motion for Protective order, Defendant's
Motion to Strike Affidavit and Plaintiff's Motion to Compel. The
plaintiff was represented by Robert H. Wilde.
represented by Bradley Tilt.

Defendant was

The Court having reviewed the memoranda

filed, listened to the argument of counsel and having reviewed the

L \D\ll843\order

1

affidavits filed in support thereof, having written and filed a
Memorandum Decision and having good cause appearing therefore:
NOW THEREFORE IT HEREBY ORDERED that;
1.

Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted

for the reasons set forth in the Court's Memorandum Decision
describing the court's reasoning that a clear and substantial public
policy against discrimination based on sex exists in Utah which
supports a cognizable cause of action for wrongful termination in
violation of public policy,
2.

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of

whether or not a cause of action exists for wrongful termination in
violation of public policy based on sexual discrimination is denied
for the reasons reflected in paragraph one,
3.

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the personal

liability of defendant Kelly Peterson is denied without prejudice and
(A^N+O
may be rcf iBpgcf after plaintiff has taken discovery,

\^ti

4.

Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint is granted.

Plaintiff's proposed second amended complaint shall be the operative
complaint herein,
5.

Plaintiff's Rule 56(f) Motion is granted,

6.

Defendant's Motion for Protective Order is denied, and

7.

Defendant's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of plaintiff is

denied.

Dated t h is

US

day of

r 2ocri<v^

Michael fc. %tixton —"*",.<«?
D i s t r i c t Cpu£fc"*ij a d^cP

L \D\11843\order
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